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A note on the core of TU-cooperative games with multiple membership externalities
Nax, Heinrich H. - In: Games 5 (2014) 4, pp. 191-203
-298) is proposed to allow for multiple membership. The definition of the core is adapted analogously and the possibilities for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010422383
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The coase theorem, the nonempty core, and the legal neutrality principle
Crettez, Bertrand - In: Review of law and economics : publ. in cooperation with … 16 (2020) 1, pp. 1-16
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012197600
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Externalities and the nucleolus
Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel; Ehlers, Lars H. - 2017
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011762529
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Externalities and the (pre)nucleolus in cooperative games
Álvarez-Mozos, Mikel; Ehlers, Lars H. - In: Mathematical social sciences 128 (2024), pp. 10-15
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014558631
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Assignment games with externalities and matching-based Cournot competition
Chen, Bo - 2013
We develop a model of assignment games with pairwise-identitydependent externalities. A concept of conjectural equilibrium is proposed, and the universal conjecture is shown to be the necessary and sufficient condition for the general existence of equilibrium. We then apply the solution concept...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010191642
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Shapley value for TU-games with multiple memberships and externalities
Sokolov, Denis - In: Mathematical social sciences 119 (2022), pp. 76-90
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013382323
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The core of aggregative cooperative games with externalities
Stamatopoulos, Giorgos - In: The B.E. journal of theoretical economics 16 (2016) 1, pp. 389-410
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011431765
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Fair agreements for sharing international rivers with multiple springs and externalities
Brink, René van den; Laan, Gerard van der; Moes, Nigel - 2010
the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011381991
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Coalitional beliefs in cournot oligopoly TU games
Lekeas, Parasekevas V. - In: International game theory review 15 (2013) 1, pp. 1-21
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009793162
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Cooperative decision-making for the provision of a locally undesirable facility
Ambec, Stefan; Kervinio, Yann - 2014
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010351370