between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves as a legal substitute for corruption. Due to the obvious lack of field …We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more … pure anticipation of future rewards from a lobbying party suffices to bias a decision-maker in favor of this party, even …

between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves as a legal substitute for corruption. Due to the obvious lack of field …We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more … pure anticipation of future rewards from a lobbying party suffices to bias a decision-maker in favor of this party, even …

between a decision-maker and a lobbying party serves as a legal substitute for corruption. Due to the obvious lack of field …We study experimentally whether anti-corruption policies with a focus on bribery might be insufficient to uncover more … pure anticipation of future rewards from a lobbying party suffices to bias a decision-maker in favor of this party, even …

economic experiment on bribery to study different compliance mechanisms through which people might be deterred from corruption …Corruption is a welfare issue worldwide, but it is difficult to study because of its secret nature. We here did a lab … information about both negative externalities of bribery and prescriptive norms are effective deterrents, and that bribe offers …

dampens cooperation, though only slightly. Surprisingly, externalities are immaterial. If we control for beliefs, they even … we add beliefs as a control variable, we only find that externalities enhance cooperation, even if gains from collusion …

expected. -- Oligopoly ; Collusion ; experiment ; Uncertainty ; negative externalities ; prisoner's dilemma … dampens cooperation, though only slightly. Surprisingly, externalities are immaterial. If we control for beliefs, they even … we add beliefs as a control variable, we only find that externalities enhance cooperation, even if gains from collusion …

morally bad instead of good. Due to this asymmetry, people punish the perpetrators of negative externalities more severely … not only moral considerations but also the information setting of perpetrators of externalities are taken into account by … ; externalities ; punishment ; praise ; moral bias …

is common knowledge that their actions produce various externalities through the training of an algorithm? In an online … experiment, we let participants' choices in dictator games train an algorithm. Thereby, they create an externality on future …

Exploiting China's anti-corruption campaign, we show that following a decrease in corruption, firm performance improves …. Small and young firms benefit more. We identify the channels through which corruption hampers firm performance. Following … the anti-corruption campaign, the allocation of capital and labor becomes more efficient. Firms operating in ex ante more …