This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with direct exter-nalities between principals both under complete and asymmetric information. Direct externalities arise when the contracting variable of one principal affects directly the other principal s payoff....

This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with direct externalities between principals both under complete and asymetric information. Direct externalities arise when the contracting variable of one principal affects directly the other pricipal`s payoff....

This paper characterizes the equilibrium sets of an intrinsic common agency game with direct externalities between principals both under complete and asymmetric information. Direct externalities arise when the contracting variable of one principal affects directly the other principal's payoff....

This paper demonstrates that mall store contracts are written to internalize externalities through both an efficient allocation and pricing of space, and an efficient allocation of incentives across stores. Certain stores generate externalities by drawing customers to other stores, while many...