the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …

is shown that an agreement will be reached without delay if any set of coalitions profits from merging. Even under this … coalition forms without delay in equilibrium, expected payoffs must be in the core of the characteristic function game that …

the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In case of …

We generalise the coalition structure core to partition function games. Our definition relies only on one crucial … initial one, and –whenever this is possible– they come to a residual core outcome. Deviating players form their optimistic or … pessimistic expectations with this in mind. This leads to a recursive definition of the core. When compared to existing approaches …

In auctions with externalities, the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of stability and fairness. We … show that the core is nonempty if the seller cannot deviate, as a counterpart of the result of the nonemptiness of the core …

allowing the network structure to be taken into account. The recursive core for network function form games generalises the … recursive core for such environments and its properties also rhyme with the corresponding inclusion properties of the optimistic … externalities. The first is of a favour network and show that the core is nonempty when players must pay transfers to intermediaries …

In auctions with externalities, it is well-known that the core can be empty, which is undesirable both in terms of … the sense that the seller and the bidders experience justified envy. We show that the core is nonempty if bidders cannot …

We generalise the coalition structure core to partition function games. Our definition relies only on one crucial … initial one, and - whenever this is possible - they come to a residual core outcome. Deviating players form their optimistic … or pessimistic expectations with this in mind. This leads to a recursive definition of the core. When compared to …

the unique welfare distribution that is core-stable and satisfies the condition that no agent gets a utility payoff above … has an increasing benefit function (no externalities) then every weighted hierarchical solution is core-stable. In ca! se …

all possible matches. Finally, we analyze a notion of the core and its relation with the set of stable assignments. …