An electrical transmission network consists of producers, consumers and the power lines connecting them. We build an ideal (lossless) DC load flow model as a cooperative game over a graph with the producers and consumers located at the nodes, each described by a maximum supply or desired demand...

Existing cooperative game theoretic studies of bargaining power in gas pipeline systems are based on the so called characteristic function form (CFF). This approach is potentially misleading if some pipelines fall under regulated third party access (TPA). TPA, which is by now the norm in the EU,...

In law as well as economics, the most well-known aspect of Coase's “The Problem of Social Cost,” is the Coase Theorem. Over the decades, that particular notion has morphed into a crucial component of Chicago law and economics — namely, transaction cost analysis. In this Article, I...

The ‘Coase theorem' has long been the idea most commonly associated with Ronald Coase's analysis in The Problem of Social Cost. Yet, Coase frequently argued late in his career that he has been misunderstood, and that the central message(s) of the article lay elsewhere. Though virtually all of...

The present paper revisits the path by which Coase came to set down the result now generally known as the Coase theorem in his 1960 article. I draw on both the published record and archival resources in an effort to clear away some of the mist and, as it will emerge, dispel some of the...

More than fifty years ago Ronald Coase published ‘The Problem of Social Cost’. In his paper, Professor Coase presents an intriguing idea that has since become known among economists and lawyers as the ‘Coase Theorem’. Unlike most modern forms of economic analysis, however, Coase’s...

This paper partially extends the f-core equivalence theorem of Hammond, Kaneko and Wooders (1989) for continuum economies with widespread externalities (i.e., those over which each individual has negligible control). Externalities need not result directly from trading activities. Neither free...

We propose a class of sharing schemes for the distribution of the gains from cooperation for coalition games with externalities. In the context of the partition function, it is shown that any member of this class of sharing schemes leads to the same set of stable coalitions in the sense of...

This paper studies coalition formation among individuals who differ in productivity. The output of a coalition is determined by the sum of productivities if the coalition exceeds a minimal threshold of members. We consider competitive societies in which the surplus of a coalition is split...