where contracts may impose externalities on other agents. The paper derives several properties of the Markov perfect … and monotonic on the contracts. If the grand coalition is not efficient we show that bargaining delays arise in positive …-externality games. Otherwise, if the grand coalition is efficient, there are no bargaining delays and convergence to the grand coalition …

continue to negotiate as long as there are gains from trade, and coalitions may create positive or negative externalities. The … bargaining solution, for games where the worth of all pairwise coalition is less than a third of the grand coalition value; the … Shapley value, for games where the sum of the value created by all pairwise coalitions is greater than the grand coalition …

We study coalition formation problems with general externalities. We prove that if expectations are not prudent a … stable coalitions structure can fail to exist. Under prudent expectations a stable coalition structure exists if the set of … admissible coalitions is single-lapping. This assumption also guarantees the existence of a stable and efficient coalition …

Consider an environment with widespread externalities, and suppose that binding agreements can be written. We study … coalition formation in such a setting. Our analysis proceeds by defining on a partition function an extensive form bargaining … concerned with the characterisation of equilibrium coalition structures. We develop an algorithm that generates (under certain …

coalition formation. It allows to make an explicit distinction between within-group and outside-group deviation options. This … the bargaining set containing a minimal winning coalition are characterized. Furthermore, it is shown that the bargaining … set of any homogeneous weighted majority game contains an outcome for which the underlying coalition structure consists of …

This chapter surveys recent models of coalition and network formation in a unified framework. Comparisons are drawn … among various procedures of network and coalition formation, involving simultaneous and sequential moves. The survey also … discussion of efficient network and coalition formation procedures and directions for future research. …

externalities are more positive, there exists a grand-coalition SSPE of the bargaining game for any discount factor. However, if the … separately, considering wage contract externalities. We show that if the two workers are sufficiently complementary or if … two workers are sufficiently substitutable, there is no grand-coalition SSPE for any discount factor. In addition, we …

for the existence of an efficient equilibrium in coalitional bargaining with externalities and renegotiations," Operations …