Showing 1 - 9 of 9
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003331264
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009748535
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002203866
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10002855542
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001496019
Barrett's (1994) paper on transboundary pollution abatement shows that if the signatories of an international environmental agreement act in a Stackelberg fashion, then, depending on parameter values, a self-enforcing IEA can have any number of signatories between two and the grand coalition....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012760859
This paper studies the impact of adaptation on the stability of an international emission agreement. To address this issue we solve a three-stage coalition formation game where in the first stage countries decide whether or not to sign the agreement. Then, in the second stage, signatories...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011899731
In this paper the stability of an International Environmental Agreement (IEA) among N identical countries that emit a pollutant are studied using a two-stage game. In the first stage each country decides noncooperatively whether or not to join an IEA, and in the second stage signatories jointly...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014074818
This paper studies the impact of adaptation on the stability of an international emission agreement. To address this issue we solve a three-stage coalition formation game where in the first stage countries decide whether or not to sign the agreement. Then, in the second stage, signatories...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014111748