In bisherigen Untersuchungen der Auswirkungen aktienkursorientierter Management-Entlohnung auf den Preiswettbewerb wurden Nachfrageschwankungen nicht berücksichtigt. Der vorliegende Beitrag zeigt, dass Manager auch dann eine größere Kollusionsneigung besitzen als Eigentümer, wenn sich die...

Dieser Beitrag zeigt, dass aktienkursabhängige Entlohnung bei korrelierter Nachfrageentwicklung die Neigung der Manager erhöht, eine implizite Preisabsprache einzuhalten. Die geringeren Gewinne in der Strafphase führen bereits in der Ausbruchsperiode zu einem niedrigeren Aktienkurs und damit...

It is often argued that Black-Scholes (1973) values overstate the subjective value of stock options granted to risk-averse and under-diversified executives. We construct a “representative” Swiss executive and extend the certainty- equivalence approach presented by Hall and Murphy (2002) to...

UK executives' stock option exercises and associated sell decisions are motivated by private, inside, information. Executives use their inside information to lock in short-term gains, and to sell stock acquired prior to negative abnormal stock returns. This informed trading is robust to the...

This paper investigates whether observed executive compensation contracts are designed to provide risk-taking incentives in addition to effort incentives. We develop a stylized principal-agent model that captures the interdependence between firm risk and managerial incentives. We calibrate the...

This paper examines how CEO pay is related to firm size and to firm performance in Finland by using new individual-level compensation data in 1996-2002. We find robust evidence that CEO average compensation has increased substantially between 1996 and 2002. For example, the ratio between CEO and...

In this paper shareholders face the trade-off between providing managers with incentives to exert beneficial effort and to engage in costly fraudulent activity. We solve for the optimal compensation package, given that shareholders can either grant (restricted) stock or stock options and given...

Classic financial agency theory recommends compensation through stock options rather than shares to induce risk neutrality in otherwise risk averse agents. In an experiment, we find that subjects acting as executives do also take risks that are excessive from the perspective of shareholders if...

Executive Stock Option Programs (SOPs) have become the dominant compensation instrument for top-management in recent years. The incentive effects of an SOP both with respect to corporate investment and financing decisions critically depend on the design of the SOP. A specific problem in...

Incentive effects of performance-based compensation schemes for management may be weakened or biased by macroeconomic influences on remuneration. These influences can be seen as reflecting luck from the CEO's perspective. In this chapter we present a model for how to avoid compensating CEO for...