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Task Difficulty, Performance Measure Characteristics, and the Trade-Off between Insurance and Well-Allocated Effort
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2006
When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011422137
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Task difficulty, performance measure characteristics, and the trade-off between insurance and well-allocated effort
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2006
When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a good allocation of effort across various …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010268002
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Task difficulty, performance measure characteristics and the trade-off between insurance and well-allocated effort
Schnedler, Wendelin - 2006
When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003379118
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Managerial payoff and gift-exchange in the field
Englmaier, Florian; Leider, Stephen - 2019
We conduct a field experiment where we vary both the presence of a gift-exchange wage and the effect of the worker's effort on the manager's payoff. Results indicate a strong complementarity between the initial wage-gift and the agent's ability to "repay the gift". We control for differences in...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012064798
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Career prospects and effort incentives : evidence from professional soccer
Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes - 2014
It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011808006
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Career prospects and effort incentives : evidence from professional soccer
Miklós-Thal, Jeanine; Ullrich, Hannes - 2014
It is difficult to test the prediction that future career prospects create implicit effort incentives because …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010442390
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Do managers with limited liability take more risky decisions? An information acquisition model
Malcomson, James M. - 2010
Risk-neutral individuals take more risky decisions when they have limited liability. Risk-neutral managers may not when acting as agents under contract and taking costly actions to acquire information before taking decisions. Limited liability makes it optimal to increase the reward for outcomes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010275809
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Task difficulty, performance measure characteristics, and the trade-off between insurance and well-allocated effort
Schnedler, Wendelin (contributor) - 2006
When designing incentives for a manager, the trade-off between insurance and a "good" allocation of effort across … ; multitasking ; incentives …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003323166
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Has moral hazard become a more important factor in managerial compensation?
Gayle, George-Levi; Miller, Robert Allen - In: The American economic review 99 (2009) 5, pp. 1740-1769
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003936335
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Do managers with limited liability take more risky decisions? : an information acquisition model
Malcomson, James M. - 2010
Risk-neutral individuals take more risky decisions when they have limited liability. Risk-neutral managers may not when acting as agents under contract and taking costly actions to acquire information before taking decisions. Limited liability makes it optimal to increase the reward for outcomes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003937594