In this study we investigate how executive equity incentives affect companies' risk-taking behavior in relationships with their customers. We hypothesize and find that executive risk-taking incentives provided by options are positively related to the degree of trade credit riskiness measured...

Until October 2004 corporate insiders in Germany were required to report trades in the shares of their firm 'without delay'. In practice substantial reporting delays were common. We show that the delays are systematically related to the characteristics of the firm. Delays are longer in...

Objectives: We examine decision factors of family firm owners for hiring a non-family Chief Financial Officer (CFO). We explore the perceptions of family firm owners towards external managers by analyzing how their family-specific and company-specific goals relate to the employment of a...

Objectives: We examine decision factors of family firm owners for hiring a non-family Chief Financial Officer (CFO). We explore the perceptions of family firm owners towards external managers by analyzing how their family-specific and company-specific goals relate to the employment of a...

This paper investigates the effect of superstar CEOs on their competitors. Exploiting shocks to CEO status due to prestigious media awards, we document a significant positive stock market performance of competitors of superstar CEOs subsequent to the award. The effect is more pronounced for...

We examine the impact of managerial optimism on the inclusion of performance-pricing provisions in syndicated loan contracts (PSD). Optimistic managers may view PSD as a relatively cheap form of financing given their upwardly biased expectations about the firm's future cash flow. Indeed, we find...

Until October 2004 corporate insiders in Germany were required to report trades in the shares of their firm "without delay". In practice substantial reporting delays were common. We show that the delays are systematically related to the characteristics of the firm. Delays are longer in...

A unified framework is presented to characterise the capital structure of firms that face borrowing restrictions - which extends the classic theory of capital by incorporating elements from actuarial and agency theory. It is demonstrated that the bankruptcy and agency costs afforded by these...

In this Article we submit that the compensation structures at banks before the financial crisis were not necessarily flawed and that recent reforms in this area largely reflect already existing best practices. In Part I we review recent empirical studies on corporate governance and executive pay...