We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We exploit exogenous variation due to the staggered adoption of corporate governance laws in formerly Communist countries coupled with detailed 'hard' information about the board's...

The founding directors of newly incorporated companies bring social capital (reputation, networks, business relationships) and human capital (task-related, professional and director experience) to a new venture and founding boards vary in degree of heterogeneity (size, diversity, turnover). This...

We examine whether governance matters for acquisitions. Acquisitions are frequently beneficial to the CEO of the acquiring firm, but can often be value-destructive to acquirer shareholders and other stakeholders such as employees. We find that corporate governance does not appear to influence...

This paper studies the first day return of 227 carve-outs during 1996-2013. I find that the first day return of newly issued subsidiary stocks is explained by the reporting distortions in the pre IPO period, conditioned on whether the executives and directors of the subsidiary received stock...

We study how well-incentivized boards monitor CEOs and whether such monitoring improves performance. Using unique, detailed data on boards' information sets and decisions for a large sample of private-equity-backed firms, we find that gathering information helps boards learn about CEO ability....

This paper analyses optimal financing contracts between potentially optimistic entrepreneurs and potentially supportive financiers. The presence of optimistic entrepreneurs (who overestimate their personal abilities to manage their venture) leads realistic financiers to bring managerial support...

We explore the impact of director social capital on credit ratings. Social capital is often associated with trust and cultivated through one's personal networks. We show that firms which employ well-connected directors benefit with a higher credit rating. This result is amplified for firms that...

Our hand-collected sample of 298 U.S. SPACs reveals that the modal SPAC CEO is a 50-year-old male MBA graduate with substantial financial expertise. In accordance with signaling theory, greater reputation gained through prior CEO experience in public companies is linked to larger SPACs. As the...

This study examines the earnings management behaviour of 455 distressed US firms that filed for bankruptcy during the period 1986-2001. We examine (a) possible earnings management during the years prior to bankruptc-filing, (b) whether qualified audit opinions cause conservative earnings...

This paper analyzes optimal financing and advising contracts between potentially optimistic entrepreneurs and potentially supportive financiers. The presence of optimistic entrepreneurs (who may overestimate their managerial abilities) leads realistic-financiers to bring managerial support even...