We examine the effects of Chinese import penetration on executive compensation of US firms. We find that import penetration reduces executives' total compensation, stock grants, wealth-performance sensitivity, and opportunistic grant timing, suggesting that competition mitigates agency problems...

We report that the probability that executives exercise options early decreases with the volatility of the underlying stock return. We interpret this to mean that executives' subjective option value increases with volatility and that option grants increase executives' risk appetite. Further...

We examine how directors with investment banking experience affect a firm's acquisition behavior. We find that the presence of investment banker directors is associated with a higher probability of subsequent acquisitions, and such positive relation is not driven by reverse causality. Focusing...

We investigate whether and how executives' social interactions affect their compensation. Using the social networks among 2,936 chief executive officers (CEOs) during 1999-2008, we report that socially connected CEOs receive significantly more similar compensation than non-connected CEOs. This...

We examine the effect of competitive shocks on executive compensation in the pharmaceutical sector. When a pharmaceutical firm receives a breakthrough therapy designation (BTD), its rivals respond by increasing option-based compensation for CEOs and other executives. The rivals also escalate...