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Executive compensation and incentives : the impact of takeover legislation
Bertrand, Marianne; Mullainathan, Sendhil - 1998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001350627
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Are CEOs rewarded for luck? : The ones without principals are
Bertrand, Marianne; Mullainathan, Sendhil - In: The quarterly journal of economics 116 (2001) 3, pp. 901-932
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001601256
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Enjoying the quiet life : Corporate governance and managerial preferences
Bertrand, Marianne; Mullainathan, Sendhil - In: Journal of political economy 111 (2003) 5, pp. 1043-1075
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001803204
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Agents with and without principals
Bertrand, Marianne; Mullainathan, Sendhil - In: The American economic review 90 (2000) 2, pp. 203-208
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001502633
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Agents with and without principals
Bertrand, Marianne; Mullainathan, Sendhil - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001558858
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Do CEOs set their own pay? : The ones without principals do
Bertrand, Marianne; Mullainathan, Sendhil - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001559081
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Do CEOs set their own pay? : The ones without principals do
Bertrand, Marianne; Mullainathan, Sendhil - 2000
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001462058
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Executive compensation and incentives : the impact of takeover legislation
Bertrand, Marianne; Mullainathan, Sendhil - 1998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000997374
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Executive compensation and incentives : the impact of takeover legislation
Mullainathan, Sendhil; Bertrand, Marianne - 1998
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10001376732
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Do CEOs Set Their Own Pay? The Ones Without Principals Do
Bertrand, Marianne - 2000
We empirically examine two competing views of CEO pay. In the contracting view, pay is used to solve an agency problem: the compensation committee optimally chooses pay contracts which give the CEO incentives to maximize shareholder wealth. In the skimming view, pay is the result of an agency...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012471166