Market regulators are concerned about the completeness of management-provided explanations in financial reports and other venues. In particular, the Securities and Exchange Commission has articulated the growing problem of firm managers selectively emphasizing information that is favorable to...

This paper replicates the results of the survey of experienced executives reported in Section IV of Seybert (2010). Seybert retracted the survey data from the originally published article due to concerns about the source of the data. I survey 79 experienced executives to elicit their beliefs...

Using the size of CEO signatures in SEC filings to measure individual narcissism, we find that it is associated with several negative firm outcomes. We first validate signature size as a measure of narcissism but not overconfidence using two laboratory studies, and also find that our measure is...

This paper replicates the results of the survey of experienced executives reported in Section IV of Seybert (2010). Seybert retracted the survey data from the originally published article due to concerns about the source of the data. I survey 79 experienced executives to elicit their beliefs...

Using the size of CEO signatures in SEC filings to measure individual narcissism, we find that CEO narcissism is associated with several negative firm outcomes. We first validate signature size as a measure of narcissism but not overconfidence using two laboratory studies, and also find that our...

We conduct an experiment to examine the effects of guidance frequency (frequent versus infrequent) and guidance goal (accuracy versus meet/beat versus truthful) on managers' operating decisions. We find that frequent guiders sacrifice total earnings for quarterly earnings predictability...