We analyze the importance of personal attributes in explaining the performance of reported share transactions by corporate insiders. While prior literature has focused on observable firm and trade characteristics, little effort has been made to understand how individual attributes, such as...

Previous literature documents that executives tend to cash out equity incentives when equity-linked compensation vests. Such a behavior destroys long-term incentives and hence is costly to outside shareholders. It is recommended that the unloading of incentives can be limited when the firm...

Using employment history of over 17,000 directors of non-financial firms, we find that boards with directors who have executive experience in a commercial bank compensate CEOs with higher inside debt. This result is consistent with arguments that professional experience shapes decision-making....

We test a number of hypotheses to assess changes in director ownership during lockup periods. We find that these transactions are additional signalling devices. Our results also imply that they are contractual arrangements between directors and underwriters, as directors increase their holdings...