Recent studies in managerial accounting point out that the firms do not fully ratchet up the managers' future performance targets based on their past performance. This study offers a novel theoretical perspective on the firm's executive compensation strategy that supports such latest empirical...

Prior research in management accounting has focused on the pay-performance incentive contracts to examine compensation of top executives. However, the recent economic crisis lessens the validity of the pay-for-performance argument because many executive officers continue to receive a substantial...

We examine factors influencing firms' strategic disclosure of executive pay in Korea. Because the disclosure rules in Korea do not mandate but only recommend that firms distinguish between inside executive directors and outside directors when reporting the average pay of directors, this...

We investigate whether managers strategically choose the tone of non-financial information disclosure based on performance and their motivations. We use 14,400 firm-year MD&As of companies listed on the Shanghai Stock Exchange and Shenzhen Stock Exchange from 2008 to 2019. The results show tone...

We examine a model that incorporates two hidden-actions of the manager: a productive effort and a manipulative effort. The manager is paid a bonus based on the accounting report that the manager can manipulate. A downward restatement of the accounting report triggers lawsuits. The manager is...

We investigate the effect of the career concerns of young CEOs and of female CEOs on their willingness to issue voluntary earnings forecasts. We argue that the labor market's perception about a young CEO's uncertain talent leads to a stronger desire to establish a good reputation by issuing more...