Social ties, as informal institutions, contribute to firms' performance in emerging economies. Formal market-supporting institutions in emerging economies are in general less developed, social ties cultivated by entrepreneurs thus serve as substitutes for formal institutional support. However,...

While Jensen and Meckling’s 1976 seminal work explores key aspects of the principal-agent relationship between owners and managers, they do not examine the principal’s decision on whether to hire the agent. An owner (principal) of a closely held firm can either hire someone to manage her...

Drawing from the literature on entrepreneurial overconfidence and M&As, we argue that founder CEO-managed firms perform worse than professional CEO-managed firms when they participate in M&A transactions. We test our predictions using a sample of acquisitions by newly listed US public firms from...

We document substantial variation across startups in whether and when they appoint outside directors, and the type of directors they appoint. The startup-director match depends on professional connections and individual experience profiles. Early-stage investors are more likely to serve as...

I extend Jensen and Meckling 1976 (“JM”) to show that the change in the firm's performance from the decision on who manages is composed of 1) JM's management agency costs and 2) skill differential agency cash flows: the difference between the owner and the firm's alternate manager in...

This paper reviews research findings on entrepreneurial top management teams within the last 20 years. It concentrates on team-based management factors and their influence on a new venture's growth and ability to raise capital. This paper integrates recent findings and provides an overview of...