Using a hand-collected executive pension database, we study how both CEO and non-CEO executive compensation structures affect the overall risk of a firm. We accomplish three major objectives: (i) we provide a significant extension of the Sundaram and Yermack (2007) research framework by...

We use a unique dataset of more than 1,000 Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers around the world to investigate the degree to which executives delegate financial decisions and the circumstances that drive variation in delegation. Delegation does not appear to be...

When partially inalienable managerial entrenchment is introduced to Zwiebel's 1996 model of dynamic capital structure, anticipated debt renegotiation between a higher-type manager and the creditor reduces expected firm value. Only lower-type managers can issue debt to avoid shareholder takeover

This article investigates the impact of the observation that managers can use cash to defer bankruptcy on default risk and corporate financial policies. I show that with managerial cash use to defer default, the impact of cash on default risk depends on two opposing channels. While cash provides...

The prevalence of zero-leverage firms is a puzzle in corporate finance. We analyze the acquisition behavior of zero-leverage firms and offer a new venue to the studies on zero-leverage puzzle and the interdependence of capital structures and investment decisions. The prior literature suggests...

While recent studies show that long vesting periods in managerial compensation increase corporate investments, it may reshape the shareholder-debtholder conflict as shareholders have to split the gains with creditors. We find that firms with longer CEO pay durations use more short-maturity...

We examine how CEO's inside-debt based compensation incentives (pension benefits and other deferred compensation) influence firm's debt maturity structure. We examine this relationship in the context of the hypothesis that CEO's inside-debt based incentives exposes managers to similar kind of...

This study examines the relationship between corporate managers' political ideology and corporate leverage policies conditional on investor sentiment. Based on a minimum of 21,884 observations over the 1992-2008 period, the authors show that Republican managers significantly reduce leverage...

In this paper we provide new evidence that corporate financing decisions are associated with managerial incentives to report high equity earnings. Managers rely most heavily on debt to finance their asset growth when their future earnings prospects are poor, when they are under pressure due to...

We develop a model of managerial compensation structure and asset risk choice. The model provides predictions about how inside debt features affect the relation between credit spreads and compensation components. First, inside debt reduces credit spreads only if it is unsecured. Second, inside...