This paper examines the responsiveness of taxable income to changes in marginal tax rates using detailed compensation data on several thousand corporate executives from 1991 to 1995. The data confirm that the higher marginal rates of 1993 led to a significant decline in taxable income....

We study how competition for talent affects CEO compensation, taking into consideration that CEO decisions and CEO skills or talent are not observable, and CEOs can manipulate performance as measured by outsiders. Firms compete by offering contracts that generate rents for the CEO. We derive the...

The purpose of this study is to examine the relationship between managers' ability and voluntary disclosure of carbon emissions and whether industry competition affects those relationships. Using Korean firms listed on the Korean stock market from 2008 to 2019, we find that high-ability managers...

The limitation of executive compensation has been a matter of public and policy debate for at least 20 years. We examine a first-time regulatory action where the deductibility of the total value of executive compensation is limited and unavoidable. We find that, rather than reduce remuneration,...

Executives use a variety of manipulative games to maximize the value of their gifts, including backdating, spring-loading, bullet-dodging and insider information. We find that executives exploit a legal loophole to backdate their gifts. Stock prices rise abnormally about 6% during the one-year...

In recent years a new phenomenon has appeared on the retirement savings landscape: the expansion into middle management ranks of a traditional tool of executive compensation, the so-called “top hat” pension plan. Top hat plans are unfunded deferred compensation programs for a “select group...