We examine the influence of auditors on mitigating corporate fraud in China, which is known to have weak legal enforcement, weak investor protection along with tight control of the media and labour unions. We find that firms with executives that have lower integrity, indicated by a greater...

The Split Share Structure Reform in China enables state shareholders of listed firms to trade their restricted shares. This renders the wealth of state shareholders more related to share price movements. We predict this reform will create remuneration arrangements that increase the relationship...

We examine the influence of auditors on corporate fraud in China. We find lower executive integrity firms are associated with higher propensity of regulatory enforcement actions against corporate fraud in the subsequent year. We then show that this effect is moderated by the issuance of modified...

We use institutional-related theories and a unique natural experiment that enables an exogenous test of the influence of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR), state shareholders held restricted shares...

The role of board secretaries is a unique institutional feature in China. Individuals in this senior executive role are responsible for coordinating information disclosure. We study the impact of board secretaries on management earnings forecasts and find that their legal expertise, accounting...

This paper studies CEOs with overseas experience, known as returnee CEOs. We show that Chinese returnee CEOs are associated with inferior performance, lower market reactions to appointment announcements and an adverse regulatory environment. We argue that CEOs' international expertise is...

We use institutional-related theories and a unique natural experiment that enables an exogenous test of the influence of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR), state shareholders held restricted shares...

This paper examines listing location as a managerial decision by using a sample of IPOs of Chinese entrepreneurial firms in mainland China, the United States and Hong Kong. We find that Chinese entrepreneurial firms managed by CEOs with international experience are more likely to undertake...

We use institutional-related theories and a unique natural experiment that enables an exogenous test of the influence of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure Reform (SSSR), state shareholders held restricted shares...

We use search volume index (SVI) for a CEO's name and stock ticker from Google Trends to measure CEO publicity, and examine the competing hypotheses on its relation to tax avoidance. On the one hand, CEOs who receive more attention from retail investors may engage in tax evasion activities to...