We examine the potential confounding effects that awarding outside directors stock options may have on the quality of financial disclosure. By aligning their interests with those of shareholders, directors should be more inclined to monitor and disclose relevant information to investors....

To ensure that audit committees provide sufficient oversight over the auditing process and quality of financial reporting, legislators have imposed stricter requirements on the independence of audit committee members. Although many audit committees appear to be “fully” independent, anecdotal...

Executive compensation practices suppose to influence the motivational level of the employees and hence affect the organizational performance. The study examines to explore how the executive compensation practices by the Bangladeshi companies affect the corporate performance. The study is...

We investigate an emerging pay-performance activism under a natural setting of performance-focused shareholder proposals rule (PSPs) (Rule 14a-8) established by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) for top management compensation. We find that: (1) PSP sponsors successfully identify...

This paper examines the initial impact of a ‘good governance' code for charitable organizations that was promulgated in the Netherlands in 2005. Data are gathered from publicly available annual reports of 138 charities in the post-implementation phase of the code (2005-2008). We first examine...

This study investigates the effects on initial public offering (IPO) outcomes of the existence and type of financial expertise of chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) serving on their own IPO firms' boards. For brevity we refer to these executives as executive...

We examine how directors' reputations are managed through disclosure choices. We focus on disclosures in the director biographies in proxy statements filed with the SEC. We find that a directorship on another board is more likely to be undisclosed when the other firm experienced an adverse event...

We investigate economic consequences of going-concern opinions in terms of corporate control, executive compensation and management turnover. We argue that announcement of going-concern opinions either decreases firm value or signals negatively to investors. Therefore, upon the announcement of...

In this study, I empirically examine whether the managers of firms that overinvest have an incentive to subsequently distort financial information for keeping up with stakeholders' expectations about investment returns. Also, because CEO tenure is related to the capacity of the manager to...

We examine the effect of competition shocks induced by major industry-level tariff cuts on forced CEO turnover. Both the likelihood of forced CEO turnover and its sensitivity to performance increase, particularly for firms with low productivity and high default risk. While CEO's incentive pay...