Even though financial reporting primarily falls within the scope of the CFO responsibilities, there is considerable evidence for the CEO's influence on corporate misreporting. Regulatory initiatives such as the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 have therefore increased the CEO's responsibility in the...

We document the emergence of “social executives,” top executives who connect with investors directly, personally, and in real time through social media, and we study the consequences of this development for financial markets. We contend that the emergence of social executives enables...

This paper examines whether analysts and investors efficiently incorporate the informational cues from managerial linguistic complexity (e.g. Fog) on conference calls into their forecasts and trading decisions. We predict that managers use linguistic complexity to obfuscate before poor future...

Financial restatements are costly, but frequent, events and many firms restate several times. This paper asks why rational managers engage in misreporting, in spite of the costly consequences. We present a simple extension to the Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) model, which provides testable...

I investigate the relation between business press attention and the incidence and properties of managers' voluntary disclosures. Specifically, I examine managers' disclosure responses to a bad news event: material lawsuits against the firm. I posit that managers' disclosure decisions are...

In this study, we explore managerial compensation contracts in Japan, based on financial reporting comparability as a basic peer firms’ setting. Although listed companies in Japan are required to disclose their managerial compensation contracts since 2019, most companies do not report the...

In this study, I summarize the current state of executive compensation, discuss measurement and incentive issues, document recent trends in executive pay in both U.S. and international firms, and analyze the evolution of executive pay over the past century. Most recent analyses of executive...

This research explores the use of control rhetoric in CEO letters between the pre and post Sarbanes Oxley periods and examines financial statement users' perception of internal controls and company performance from the CEO letter. We compare the amount of control rhetoric included in CEO letters...

This study investigates how the disclosure of management compensation contracts affects executive behavior by modeling a situation in which both the principal-agent relationship and market interactions are important. We find that making the disclosure of these contracts mandatory creates...

A significant amount of earnings management (EM) research has treated managers' EM decision processes as a “black box”. The objective of this study is to begin to open the black box though examining the relative importance of economic factors as well as ethical considerations in managers' EM...