Corporate governance studies typically assume that the CEO is the main locus of business power. However, when the CEO and Chairman positions are split, the de facto role of corporate leader may reside in the hands of a person who usually chairs the board but does not necessarily hold the CEO...

Owing to the decreased profitability of real economy and the significantly increased return on financial assets since the beginning of the 21st century, non-financial firms in China are increasingly inclined to hold more financial assets. This paper performs an empirical study on the...

I examine the reputation and regulatory effects on the directors' turnover and their directorships when firms are accused of fraudulent financial reporting (FR). The results show that the directors at FR firms incur reputation costs from abnormal turnover in relation to the directors at non-FR...

How to address managerial short-termism has been an important issue for companies, regulators, and researchers. In this paper we examine the impact of CEO contractual protection, in the form of employment agreements and severance pay agreements, on managerial short-termism. We find that firms...

This study demonstrates that suitable professional expertise on corporate boards can have a significant impact on firm outcomes. The analysis examines diversity of expertise on boards, its link to shareholder value, and adds to the literature by introducing corporate life cycle and industry...

Our study explores how managerial stock holdings and option holdings affect CEOs' income smoothing incentives. Given the different roles of stock holdings and option holdings in solving agency problems, managers may smooth past earnings using discretionary accruals for the purpose of revealing...

We examine whether CEO extraversion, an important personality trait associated with leadership, affects firms' expected cost of equity capital. We measure CEO extraversion using CEOs' speech patterns during the unscripted portion of conference calls. After controlling for several CEO and firm...

Financial restatements are costly, but frequent, events and many firms restate several times. This paper asks why rational managers engage in misreporting, in spite of the costly consequences. We present a simple extension to the Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) model, which provides testable...

This study examines the impact of CEO inside debt on earnings management. Theory predicts that CEOs with higher inside debt holdings adopt less risky corporate policies and choose investment policies that result in less volatile earnings. Under such circumstances, CEOs would face weaker demand...

We propose a framework that advances our understanding of CEO retention decisions in misreporting firms. Consistent with economic intuition, outside directors are more likely to fire (retain) CEOs when retention (replacement) costs are high relative to replacement (retention) costs. When the...