The astonishing collapse of the largest financial institutions managed by repulsively high-paid Wall Street executives led to the Say-on-Pay rules in the Dodd-Frank legislation. However, the shareholders of S&P 500 firms do not seem to exercise their newly granted right as anticipated by the...

This paper examines the relation between managerial power and compensation for Chief Executive Officers of S&P 500 companies from 1993 through 2012. We find that more-powerful CEOs earn more than less-powerful CEOs. We refer to this additional compensation as a “power premium” and...

This study investigates the relation between the use of explicit employment agreements (EA) and CEO compensation. Overall, our findings are broadly consistent with the predictions of Klein, Crawford, and Alchian (1978) that an EA is used to induce CEOs to make firm-specific human capital...

This paper examines why powerful CEOs are paid more in total compensation. Broadly, our results are consistent with the managerial ability view. First, CEO power is endogenously determined reflecting the CEO's ability. Specifically, founder-CEOs are more powerful than professional- and heir-CEOs...

We examine the relationship between portfolio risk and equity returns over different investment horizons of institutional investors. Compared to long-term institutions, portfolios held by short-term institutions exhibit higher factor loadings in market, size, and momentum. In particular, they...