We examine how shareholders' trust in managers is affected by the outcome of earnings management (inconsistent vs. consistent with shareholders' interests) and the method of earnings management (accruals vs. real methods). Using a controlled experiment, we predict and find that trust is impaired...

We examine how shareholders' trust in managers is affected by (1) the outcome of earnings management (inconsistent vs. consistent with shareholders' interests) and (2) the method of earnings management (accruals vs. real methods). Using a controlled experiment, we predict and find that trust is...

The Dodd-Frank Act requires firms to include a clawback or holdback clause in executive compensation contracts. Using an experiment, we examine how executives react to the enforcement of these clauses after a restatement. We find that executives generally reduced the riskiness of their financial...

We examine if investor expectations of two common disclosure mediums (conference calls and Twitter) interact with a CEO's communication style to influence investor judgments. Consistent with theory, results show that when the disclosure medium is a conference call, investors are less willing to...

We examine how CEOs can facilitate the development of investor trust that helps mitigate the effects of negative information. Results from an experiment show that investors trust the CEO more and are more willing to invest in the firm when the CEO communicates firm news followed by a negative...

We examine how CEOs can facilitate the development of investor trust that helps mitigate the effects of negative information. Results from an experiment show that investors trust the CEO more and are more willing to invest in the firm when the CEO communicates firm news followed by a negative...