We propose and test the hypothesis that overconfident-CEOs, with upwardly-biased estimates of own firm-value, are more predisposed to repurchasing stock. An implication is that the stock-market, recognizing overconfident-CEO behavior, will react less positively to repurchase announcements. The...

The literature posits that some CEO overconfidence benefits shareholders, though high levels may not. We argue adequate controls and independent viewpoints provided by an independent board mitigates the costs of CEO overconfidence. We use the concurrent passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and...

We examine the impact of overconfidence on compensation structure. We test alternative hypotheses, drawing upon and extending existing theories. Our findings support the exploitation hypothesis: firms offer incentive-heavy compensation contracts to overconfident CEOs to exploit their...

We use over 22,000 firm-year observations from 1995-2010 to investigate whether combining roles of CEO and board-chair causes poor performance. Our research design allows us to reconcile disagreement in the literature about whether CEO-chair duality impacts shareholder value. CEOs are awarded...

We show that managerial learning from stock prices can lead to feedback loop vulnerability: liquidity-induced trading can impose a negative externality on the firm's investment decisions, inducing liquidity unconstrained investors to sell their stock holdings. Interestingly, overconfident...

Are overconfident executives more likely to be promoted to CEOs? Using an option-based overconfidence measure, we show that firms with overconfident executives tend to hire internally. Further, when firms hire internally, they are more likely to pick a more confident candidate. The results...