Managerial overconfidence, originally disputed in terms of finance and accounting, has been dated back to Malmendier and Tate (2005a,b). Galasso and Simcoe (2011) studied the relationship between CEO overconfidence and innovation, focusing on patents, in which they found that overconfident CEO...

Using a novel, manually-collected dataset, we find that firms whose chief executive officer (CEO) is an inventor experience significantly better innovation outcomes, as measured by patents and future citations. We obtain these results in models with firm fixed effects, in...

Does earnings management, even though legal, hinder investor trust in reported earnings? Or do investors regard earnings management as a way for firms to convey private information, or simply as a neutral feature of financial reporting? We find that past abstinence from earnings management...

This paper examines the relation between cognitive perceptions of management and firm valuation. We develop a composite measure of investor perception using 30-second content-filtered video clips of initial public offering (IPO) roadshow presentations. We show that this measure, designed to...

We study conference calls as a voluntary disclosure channel and create a proxy for the time horizon that senior executives emphasize in their communications. We find that our measure of disclosure time horizon is associated with capital market pressures and executives' short-term monetary...

The Securities and Futures Bureau (SFB) of Taiwan prescribes that firms applying for an initial listing after February 2002 must have at least two seats of independent directors (IDs) on the board. Under the SFB 2002 rules, this paper investigates the effect of such governance reforms in ID...

In this study, we explore managerial compensation contracts in Japan, based on financial reporting comparability as a basic peer firms’ setting. Although listed companies in Japan are required to disclose their managerial compensation contracts since 2019, most companies do not report the...

CEOs of S&P 500 firms that report high non-GAAP earnings relative to GAAP earnings receive more than $600 thousand in unexplained pay. The abnormally high pay appears even after controlling for the level of non-GAAP earnings and despite relatively weak GAAP performance and low returns....

Financial restatements are costly, but frequent, events and many firms restate several times. This paper asks why rational managers engage in misreporting, in spite of the costly consequences. We present a simple extension to the Fischer and Verrecchia (2000) model, which provides testable...

Using combinations of accounting and stock market performance measures, we advance a comprehensive multidimensional framework for modelling management performance. This framework proposes “poor” management, “myopia”, “hyperopia” and “efficient” management, as four distinct...