We consider forecast guidance as a mechanism that managers use to avoid negative earnings surprises. Modeling forecast guidance using methods by Matsumoto, [Accounting Review 77 (3) (2002) 483-514] and Bartov et al. [Journal of Accounting and Economics 33 (2) (2002) 173-204], we show that...

This paper make four important contributions to the accounting literature. First, it shows that discretionary accruals are associated with CEO cash compensation, but that the coefficient is significantly less than that on nondiscretionary accruals. Second, a differential reaction is found to...

Managers in their terminal years have an incentive to manipulate earnings to enhance earnings based bonuses. We examine this horizon problem by considering the role of the compensation committee in setting terminal-year compensation. We predict that compensation committees are aware of the...

We investigate if high-ability managers are more likely to intentionally smooth earnings, a form of earnings management, and when they are more likely to do so. Although prior studies provide evidence that high-ability managers report higher quality earnings, the literature does not indicate...

This paper independently replicates the results of the survey of experienced financial managers reported in section 4 of Libby and Rennekamp (2012). Using the same questions as Libby and Rennekamp (2012), we survey 110 experienced managers to examine their beliefs about the relationship between...

This study examines the sensitivity of CEO compensation to fair value gains and losses in derivatives for firms in the U.S. oil and gas industry. Our evidence indicates that firms use derivatives for both hedging and non-hedging purposes and that the derivative gains have a substantial impact on...

The incentive effect of CEO portfolio delta (i.e., the sensitivity of CEO wealth to changes in stock price) on financial misreporting is inconclusive given a complex reward-risk tradeoff faced by CEOs (e.g., a positive “reward effect” versus a negative “risk effect”). We propose that the...

We examine a model that incorporates two hidden-actions of the manager: a productive effort and a manipulative effort. The manager is paid a bonus based on the accounting report that the manager can manipulate. A downward restatement of the accounting report triggers lawsuits. The manager is...

Based on signal theory and legitimacy theory, this paper examines whether firms with financial reporting misstatements (restatements) would prefer conservative financial reporting to send signals regarding their determinants of improving financial reporting credibility and legitimate...

This study examines the association between CFO equity incentives and earnings management. CEO equity incentives have been shown to be associated with accruals management and the likelihood of beating analyst forecasts (Bergstresser and Philippon, 2006; Cheng and Warfield, 2005). Because CFOs'...