This paper examines why overconfident CEOs issue more debt than equity within U.S. Real Estate Investment Trusts (REITs) and the value implications of this debt preference. Consistent with a demand-side story, I find that overconfident CEOs choose to issue more debt than equity than their...

This paper investigates the relation between unionization and corporate governance practices in the United States. For unionized firms to secure a bargaining advantage, we hypothesize that the managers of such firms will optimally adopt structures of governance that increase managerial power and...

This paper extends our knowledge of corporate debt maturity structure by examining whether and to what extent overconfident CEOs affect maturity decisions. Consistent with a demand side story, we find that firms with overconfident CEOs tend to adopt a shorter debt maturity structure by using a...

This paper examines whether CEO turnover within a bankrupt firm predicts the firm's likelihood to reemerge from bankruptcy proceedings as a reorganized entity. Using 836 bankruptcy cases filed under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code from 1989 through 2016, we show that firms that...

This paper examines whether CEOs with shorter initial contract lengths suffer from greater pressure and consequently engage in more visible efforts via mergers and acquisitions (M&As). By using CEO initial fixed-term contracts and exploiting U.K. corporate governance reform as an exogenous...

This paper examines executive and nonexecutive performance-vested (p-v) restricted stock grants and the extent to which setting an attainable goal affects corporate innovation. Using a Monte-Carlo simulation framework and exploiting an exogenous variation in Offshore Service Outsourcing (OSO)...