Using hand-collected data on CEO appointments during shareholder activism campaigns, this study examines whether shareholder involvement in CEO recruiting affects frictions in CEO hiring decisions. The results indicate that appointments of CEOs who are recruited with shareholder activist...

We study whether shareholder scrutiny affects CEO pay. Our identification strategy exploits the fact that recent "say-on-pay" regulation allowed firms to hold votes every two or three years. Depending on their voting frequency, firms experience alternating years where scrutiny on compensation...

We examine the influence of proxy advisors on firms’ shareholder engagement behavior. Our analyses exploit a quasi-natural experiment using Say-On-Pay voting outcomes near a threshold that triggers a review of engagement activities by Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS). Firms receiving...

We investigate how mutual funds with environmental, social, and governance (ESG) objectives vote on shareholder proposals related to executive compensation. Using a sample of 94,695 votes by 2,354 mutual funds from 2012 to 2021, we find that ESG funds are 9.4% more likely than non-ESG funds to...

The ideological chasm between environmentalism and a profit driven corporate agenda at times seems insurmountable. Environmental regulation at present is highly reliant upon statutory regulation and governmental intervention whilst corporations law is based to the greatest extent possible on an...