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In this paper, we investigate the consequences of fraud for CEOs and whether these consequences depend on CEO power. We … find that CEO power can reduce the likelihood of director turnover as well as CEO turnover after fraud detection. Further …, we find that CEO power is negatively related to long-term stock performance after fraud detection and this negative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013046275
In within-firm analysis of 1,805 executives, executives implicated in financial reporting fraud cases have … significantly stronger equity incentives than their within-firm peers who are not implicated in the fraud. Executives implicated in … fraud cases also have significantly stronger equity incentives than executives at non-fraud firms in similar roles. However …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013211715
This paper examines how companies respond to negative ESG incidents by appointing directors with experience in charitable organizations. We find that firms are more likely to make such appointments following ESG incidents, especially when these incidents attract substantial media attention or...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014349962
CEO activism — the practice of CEOs taking public positions on environmental, social, and political issues not directly related to their business — has become a hotly debated topic in corporate governance. To better understand the implications of CEO activism, we examine its prevalence, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012001263
of controlling shareholders on managerial accountability to corporate fraud. In China, prior to the Split Share Structure … economic incentives are important to promote corporate governance and deter fraud …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013059619
risk of corporate fraud. Appointment-based CEO connectedness in executive suites and boardrooms increases the likelihood of … committing fraud and decreases the likelihood of detection. Additionally, it decreases expected costs of fraud by helping to … conceal frauds, making CEO dismissal less likely upon fraud discovery, and lowering the coordination costs of carrying out …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013035085
In this article, we argue that the U.S. corporate governance rules put too much faith in the independent board members and insufficient emphasis on the shareholders themselves to control and monitor the top management. Given the agency problem between the board of directors and the shareholders,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011748205
associated with a three-fold higher likelihood of corporate fraud and that the association is attenuated for firms with stronger …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013289572