This paper investigates the impact of corporate acquisitions on CEO compensation and CEO turnover of family firms in Continental Europe. We find that CEOs in family firms do not experience an increase in their compensation during the post-acquisition period, while there is a positive and...

We study the effects of family control on CEO pay from the perspective of behavioral agency model (BAM), with particular focus on family firm's generational stage and CEO family ties. Using a panel of Australian listed firms, we find that family firms present lower total and variable CEO pay,...

This paper investigates how family ownership, control and management affect firm investment performance. We use the identity of the CEO and the COB to establish under what management the firm is: founder, descendent or external management. The analysis shows that founder management has no effect...

This paper investigates the impact of family control and institutional investors on CEO pay packages in Continental Europe, using a large data set of 915 listed firms with 4,045 firm-year observations from 14 countries over the period 2001-2008. We find that family control curbs the level of CEO...

This paper investigates the impact of family control and institutional investors on CEO pay packages in Continental Europe, using a dataset of 754 listed firms with 3,731 firm-year observations from 14 countries during 2001-2008. We find that family control curbs the level of CEO total and cash...

Family owners and foreign institutional investors have played a vital role in shaping the development of corporate compensation practices in Asian emerging markets. However, family owners and foreign institutional investors may differ in their use of incentive plans for top management as a...

Employing data on publicly listed Indian manufacturing firms covering the period 1996-2012, we investigate the impact of the presence of banker-director on the board of family firms. We posit several hypotheses that highlight the pros and cons of the presence of banker-directors. The findings...

Institutional investor interest associated with firm wealth and required monitor on board of director. In order to remaining board motivation higher remuneration should be awarded especially to family executive due to top position is among them. This study examined the relationship between the...

According to the prior literature, family executives of family-controlled firms receive lower compensation than non-family executives. One of the key driving forces behind this is the existence of family members who are not involved in management, but own significant fraction of shares and...

We analyze the propensity to hedge of closely-held family firms and the effect of a CEO's identity in explaining hedging decisions. We find that family involvement in CEO positions positively affects the likelihood of hedging. The effect is stronger when the CEO belongs to the founding family,...