We use agency theory to investigate the influence of CEO dominance on variation in capital structure. Due to agency conflicts, managers may not always adopt leverage choices that maximize shareholders' value. Consistent with the prediction of agency theory, the evidence reveals that, when the...

We use a unique dataset of more than 1,000 Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers around the world to investigate the degree to which executives delegate financial decisions and the circumstances that drive variation in delegation. Delegation does not appear to be...

We examine the impact of managerial risk exposure on capital structure selection by comparing a sample of 123 all-equity firms to a set of levered firms matched on the basis of industry, market cap and market-to-book assets. Net debt levels decline as CEO wealth sensitivity to stock price...

This article investigates the impact of the observation that managers can use cash to defer bankruptcy on default risk and corporate financial policies. I show that with managerial cash use to defer default, the impact of cash on default risk depends on two opposing channels. While cash provides...

This study examines the relation between CEO tournament incentives, proxied by the difference between CEO pay and the median pay of the senior executives of a given firm, and corporate debt contracting. We find negative relations between CEO pay gap and the cost of debt and default risk, and a...

We examine CEO partisanship and the speed of adjustment to target leverage ratios. Republicans, who prior literature views as risk-averse, are expected to move more aggressively to their targets when over-levered and more slowly when under-levered. However, Republicans’ dislike of taxes...

We show that measurable managerial characteristics have significant explanatory power for corporate financing decisions. First, managers who believe that their firm is undervalued view external financing as overpriced, especially equity. Such overconfident managers use less external finance and,...

When partially inalienable managerial entrenchment is introduced to Zwiebel's 1996 model of dynamic capital structure, anticipated debt renegotiation between a higher-type manager and the creditor reduces expected firm value. Only lower-type managers can issue debt to avoid shareholder takeover

Motivated by agency theory, we explore how powerful CEOs view leverage. Due to the agency conflict, CEOs may adopt sub-optimal leverage levels that promote their own private benefits at the expense of shareholders. Using Bebchuk, Cremers, and Peyer's (2011) CEO pay slice (CPS) to gauge CEO...

This study aims to prove the support of Agency Theory and Behavioral Consistency Theory as a solution to explain the role of leverage in mediating the influence of male CEO masculinity on research and development. This study uses a quantitative approach with a population and research sample...