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Financial debt contracting and managerial agency problems

Imbierowicz, Björn; Streitz, Daniel - In: Financial management : FM 53 (2024) 1, pp. 99-118

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014543536

Managerial optimism and debt contract design : the case of syndicated loans

Adam, Tim R.; Burg, Valentin; Scheinert, Tobias; … - 2014

behavioral aspects can affect contract design in the market for syndicated loans. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010403646

Incentives, Termination Payments, and CEO Contracting

Gillan, Stuart - 2017

Many executives have compensation that is potentially forfeit conditioned on the circumstances surrounding their departure from the firm. We study firms' endogenous decisions to use such compensation "holdbacks" as a bonding device and find that firms with higher executive replacement costs,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012958840

All hat and no cattle? : ESG incentives in executive compensation

Efing, Matthias; Ehmann, Stefanie; Kampkötter, Patrick; … - 2024

This paper examines the integration of ESG performance metrics into executive compensation using a detailed panel dataset of European executives. Despite becoming more widespread, most ESG metrics are largely discretionary, carry immaterial weights in payout calculations, and contribute little...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10015077841

Performance-Based Vesting Compensation and Debt Contracting

King, Tao-Hsien Dolly - 2019

influence bank loan contracting and credit ratings. Consistent with our risk-shifting hypothesis, we find that the p-v based …-v based compensation on firms' credit rating. We find the incentive induced by p-v based compensation carry out to the credit … rating market by reducing the firm's credit rating …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012865414

Managerial Biases and Debt Contract Design : The Case of Syndicated Loans

Adam, Tim - 2018

We examine whether managerial overconfidence impacts the use of performance-pricing provisions in loan contracts (PSD). Managers with biased views may issue PSD because they consider this form of debt to be mispriced. Our evidence shows that overconfident managers are more likely to issue...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012940196

The relation between earnings-based measures in firm debt contracts and CEO pay sensitivity to earnings

Rhodes, Adrienne - In: Journal of accounting & economics 61 (2016) 1, pp. 1-22

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011453403

Inside debt and the design of corporate debt contracts

Anantharaman, Divya; Fang, Vivian W.; Gong, Guojin - In: Management science : journal of the Institute for … 60 (2014) 5, pp. 1260-1280

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010369814

CEO Contractual Protection and Debt Contracting

Chen, Xia; Cheng, Qiang; Lo, Alvis K.; Wang, Xin - 2022

CEO contractual protection, in forms of CEO employment agreements and CEO severance pay agreements, is prevalent among S&P 1500 firms. While prior research has examined the impact of these agreements on corporate decisions from shareholders’ perspective, there is little research on the impact...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014235938

Executive Integrity, Audit Opinion, and Fraud in Chinese Listed Firms

Chen, Jiandong - 2013

We examine the influence of auditors on mitigating corporate fraud in China, which is known to have weak legal enforcement, weak investor protection along with tight control of the media and labour unions. We find that firms with executives that have lower integrity, indicated by a greater...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013089172

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