We analyze the appointments of outside CEOs of financial and non-financial firms as independent directors on US bank boards and their implications for the banks and the outside CEO firms. We show that outside CEOs from financial firms match with less traditional banks and their appointment...

Using a unique international dataset, we show that the CEOs of large banks exhibit an increased probability of forced turnover when their organizations are more exposed to idiosyncratic tail risks. The importance of idiosyncratic tail risk in CEO dismissals is strengthened when there is more...

Coordination problems amongst creditors are reduced when a firm's debt structure is concentrated in fewer debt types. Using a sample of US non-financial firms, we show that an increase in risk-taking incentives in CEO pay is associated with a greater debt concentration by debt type. This result...

Outside CEOs from non-financial firms match with boards of lending-oriented banks and are sought for their networks. They do not improve board advising and monitoring but their appointment results in lending expansion, increased bank CEO compensation, and more bank debt for their firms. The...