Using a sample of partially privatized state-owned enterprises (SOEs) listed in China's A-share stock market, this study investigates whether the regional institutions and CEO's political connectedness will affect the listed firms' hiring and firing decisions about CEOs, and what are the...

We examine how management stock options affect corporate risk taking. We exploit exogenous variation in stock option grants generated by FAS 123R and use loan spreads to infer risk taking. Using a difference-in-differences approach, we find that the spreads of loans taken by firms that did not...

In 2001, Nevada significantly limited the personal legal liability of corporate officers and directors. We use this exogenous shock to implement a differences-in-differences design that examines the impact of officer and director litigation risk on agency costs. We find decreased firm value,...

The aim of this paper is to explain relationship between earning management, corporate governance and managerial optimism through the governance characteristics that are board of directors such as independence, duality and size and ownership structure such as managerial participation, block...

We use a unique data set of over two million matched employer-employee-year observations in Italy over the 1994-2000 period to identify the causal effect of a quasi-exogenous shock to within-firm pay inequality on firm performance, investment, and payout policies. Consistent with our theoretical...

While quarterly reporting can provide timely information to investors and mitigate information asymmetry between managers and investors, it may also generate managerial myopic behavior. This study examines whether mandatory quarterly reporting induces managerial myopic behavior in Japanese...

In this study, I summarize the current state of executive compensation, discuss measurement and incentive issues, document recent trends in executive pay in both U.S. and international firms, and analyze the evolution of executive pay over the past century. Most recent analyses of executive...

We analyze 228 executive compensation contracts voluntarily disclosed by Chinese listed firms and find that central-government-controlled companies disclose more information in executive compensation contracts than local-government-controlled and non-government-controlled companies. Cash-based...

This paper studies the effects of interlocked boards of directors on voluntary disclosures, governance practices and earnings quality. The Canadian environment, where director interlocks are prevalent, is examined. A checklist of twenty voluntary disclosure measures from proxy statements is...

Early empirical studies find a negative association between firm performance and shareholder activism, whereas more recent studies document a positive association. We argue and theoretically show that this change in behavior results from mandating executive compensation disclosure. We develop a...