The aim of this paper is to explain relationship between earning management, corporate governance and managerial optimism through the governance characteristics that are board of directors such as independence, duality and size and ownership structure such as managerial participation, block...

Using hand-collected data of bank loans and CEO turnovers in China, we investigate whether common ownership compromises creditors’ governance role when borrowers underperform. Unlike prior literature on the overall lack of bank monitoring on state-owned enterprises (SOEs) in China, we argue...

This study examines the managerial power-hypothesis of selective hedging, which holds that selective hedging is observed more frequently in companies where managers have greater latitude to execute hedging proposals without serious scrutiny or questioning. The hypothesis is tested using...

This paper investigates the differential impact of positive and negative excessive managerial entrenchment on the CEO turnover-performance sensitivity, CEO compensation, and firm performance. We measure the degree of managerial entrenchment using the E-index introduced by Bebchuk et al. (2009)....

Exploiting an exogenous disclosure rule change and the unique dual-class share system in China, this study tests whether improved information disclosure leads to higher executive compensation. Consistent with the theoretical prediction in Hermalin and Weisbach (2012), we find that after China...

This paper is the third chapter of the third edition of The Anatomy of Corporate Law: A Comparative and Functional Approach, by Reinier Kraakman, John Armour, Paul Davies, Luca Enriques, Henry Hansmann, Gerard Hertig, Klaus Hopt, Hideki Kanda Mariana Pargendler, Georg Ringe, and Edward Rock...

We present empirical evidence that firms inflate earnings around seasoned equity offerings in the presence of large outsider blockholdings, but not in their absence. The finding is robust to several alternative explanations, including differences in firm characteristics, growth, performance, CEO...

Purpose: This study explores the probability of expropriation of minority shareholders by controlling shareholders in the form of CEO compensation under an imperfect governance institution by using a novel Chinese dataset over 2001-2010.Design/methodology/approach: We use a direct method to...

Grounded in agency theory, this paper investigates the effect of board independence on managerial ownership. We exploit the passage of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the associated exchange listing requirements as an exogenous regulatory shock that raises board independence. Our...

This paper examines the impact of managerial ownership on cash holding decisions of the firms listed in Borsa Istanbul 100 index between 2005 and 2013. Main aim of the study is to analyse whether there is any evidence for managerial alignment or managerial entrenchment effect on the corporate...