Are the professional networks of corporate directors valuable? More connected directors may have better information and more influence, which can increase firm value. However, these directors may also be busy or spread value-decreasing practices. To separate the effect of director networks on...

The theoretical predictions about the net impact of board network on firm performance are ambiguous and the issue becomes even more complex in emerging economies characterized by concentrated ownership structure and dominated by business group firms. This paper empirically analyzes the effect of...

We present causal evidence on the e↵ect of boardroom networks on firm value and compensation policies. We exploit a ban on interlocking directorates of Italian financial and insurance companies as exogenous variation and show that firms that lose centrality in the network experience negative...

This study seeks to disentangle the human capital and the social capital of directors to improve our understanding of the value that directors bring to their boardroom. Employing social network analysis (SNA) to measure the social capital of directors and using a unique and comprehensive sample...

Our study examines whether CEOs’ birth order can predict firms’ credit ratings. Consistent with studies that document a positive relationship in the general population between being firstborn and being conservative, our study finds that firms managed by firstborn CEOs tend to have higher...

Harnessing CEO overconfidence whilst exploiting their risk appetite and over-optimism has long been of interest to management scholars and firms. We find that overconfident CEOs’ reluctance to access external financing indicates that they reduce their acquisition activity at high rating...

This paper investigates under what circumstances boards of directors fire CEOs and whether this action leads to better firm performance. We use unique and detailed data, covering 473 companies in the transition region, on boards’ actions, expectations and beliefs about CEO ability. We find...

We test under what circumstances boards discipline managers and whether such interventions improve performance. We exploit exogenous variation due to the staggered adoption of corporate governance laws in formerly Communist countries coupled with detailed ‘hard’ information about the...

This study examines the earnings management behaviour of 455 distressed US firms that filed for bankruptcy during the period 1986-2001. We examine (a) possible earnings management during the years prior to bankruptc-filing, (b) whether qualified audit opinions cause conservative earnings...

In studies of corporate governance by default, information asymmetry is assumed, based on the principle-agent theory, between investors and executives, and also by default it is assumed that executives have superior information over investors. In this paper I apply the more rich theory of...