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In this study, we examine whether the social capital surrounding the firm’s corporate headquarters mitigates managerial self-dealing in the form of opportunistic insider trading. We find strong evidence that the level of social capital in the region surrounding the firm’s headquarters is...
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Despite the importance of sell-side financial analysts as information intermediaries in the capital market, little is known about how managerial equity ownership associates with their information environment. Using Barron, Kim, Lim and Stevens' (1998) framework of measuring information...
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Boards sometimes cut a CEO's pay following poor performance. This study examines whether such CEO paycuts really work. We identify 1,496 instances of large CEO paycuts during the period 1994-2013. We then create a propensity-score-matched control group of firms that did not cut their CEOs' pay...
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We examine the relationship between audit committee directors' unequal allocation of attention to multiple directorships and firms' earnings management. We find that firms with a greater proportion of audit committee directors for whom the directorship is more important than their other...
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We investigate whether accounting comparability is associated with the likelihood that CEO compensation is tied to relative accounting performance (e.g., return on assets). We predict that higher accounting comparability increases the risk-sharing benefit of accounting-based RPE because peer...
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Masulis and Mobbs (2014, 2015) find that independent directors with multiple directorships allocate their monitoring effort unequally based on a directorship's relative prestige. We investigate whether bank loan contract terms reflect such unequal allocation of directors' monitoring effort. We...
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