We identify the power of institutional blockholders to influence management using previous occurrences of forced CEO turnover at other firms in the blockholders' overall portfolio. We create a “powerful blockholder linkage” measure that strongly predicts future forced CEO turnover. These...

Analyzing data from approximately 1.5 million employees across 1,108 established public and private US companies, we find that employee beliefs about their firm's purpose is weaker in public companies. This difference is most pronounced within the salaried middle and hourly ranks, rather than...

Higher CEO incentives can both reduce the conflict between management and shareholders, thereby making blockholder monitoring less necessary (“substitution effect”), and increase the ability to punish recalcitrant CEOs through blockholder’s exit, thereby making blockholder monitoring more...

Purpose – The aim of this study is to investigate the relationship between financial decisions and ownership structure using the control contests on a sample of Italian listed companies.Design/methodology/approach – The analysis adopts a balanced panel data-set of 984 firm-year observations...

In this paper, we develop and test a theory on the effect of institutional investor heterogeneity on CEO pay. Our theory predicts that institutional investors' incentives and capabilities to monitor CEO pay are determined by the fiduciary responsibilities, conflicts of interest, and information...

We analyse the combined effects of bargaining power, managerial ability/effort, and risk-taking strategies on the choice of hedge fund (HF) incentive contracts, and hedge fund performance. In our model, the HF manager and outside investors first negotiate over the type of contract (asymmetric or...

We show that the allocation of managerial ownership to individuals within firms varies depending upon the joint distribution of decision control and decision management rights. Using a unique dataset of institutional investment management firms, we show that ownership is higher for managers:...

This paper examines the relationship between performance and top executive turnovers using a sample of 81 turnovers and matching companies listed on the Copenhagen Stock Exchange. We find that poor market performance increases the probability of management replacements and that forced layoffs...

We investigate the relative importance of managerial entrenchment and incentive alignment as indicated by REIT risk-taking. The two theories make contradictory predictions about the sign of the relation between insider ownership and risk. We test for the possibility of diminishing entrenchment...