Narrow search
Showing 1 - 10 of 3,897
Cover Image
Credit Stimulus, Executive Compensation, and Firm Leverage
Dahiya, Sandeep - 2020
We show that executive ownership is a significant driver of the demand for credit following credit expansion policies. Our focus on credit demand is in contrast to most studies that have focused on credit supply factors such as bank-capital. Our identification exploits the large and unexpected...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012854426
Cover Image
Executive Compensation and Corporate Financing Policies : Evidence from CEO inside Debt
Freund, Steven - 2017
We examine the relation between chief executive officer (CEO) inside debt holdings and the firm's choice between debt and equity financing when it accesses external capital markets. We find positive relations between CEO inside debt holdings and both the firm's likelihood to issue debt and the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012946174
Cover Image
Capital Allocation and Delegation of Decision-Making Authority within Firms
Graham, John R. - 2014
We use a unique dataset of more than 1,000 Chief Executive Officers (CEOs) and Chief Financial Officers around the world to investigate the degree to which executives delegate financial decisions and the circumstances that drive variation in delegation. Delegation does not appear to be...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013070199
Cover Image
CEO Tournament Incentives and Corporate Debt Contracting
Ghosh, Chinmoy; Huang, Di; Nguyen, Nam; Phan, Hieu V. - 2022
This study examines the relation between CEO tournament incentives, proxied by the difference between CEO pay and the median pay of the senior executives of a given firm, and corporate debt contracting. We find negative relations between CEO pay gap and the cost of debt and default risk, and a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014235416
Cover Image
A Model of Managerial Compensation, Firm Leverage and Credit Stimulus
Dahiya, Sandeep - 2018
We study a model in which leverage and compensation are both choice variables for the firm and borrowing spreads are endogenous. First, we analyze the correlation between leverage and variable compensation. We show that allowing for both endogenous compensation and leverage fully rationalizes...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012931776
Cover Image
CEO's Inside Debt and Dynamics of Capital Structure
Brisker, Eric R. - 2016
Debt-type compensation (i.e., inside debt) exacerbates the divergence in risk preference between the CEO and shareholders that in turn affects the firm's capital structure decisions. An excessively risk-averse CEO uses debt that falls short of the shareholders' desired level, and is eager to...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000976
Cover Image
Golden Parachutes, Takeover Incentive, and Risk-Taking
Chen, Dong - 2014
-taking. These results are consistent with the “takeover incentive hypothesis,” an original proposition stating that GPs influence … risk-taking through the incentive of a CEO with a GP to accept a takeover, as well as delta's role in affecting the weight … of the CEO's incentive to maximize the expected takeover-associated equity portfolio wealth. The findings do not support …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013065544
Cover Image
Stock Performance or Entrenchment? The Effects of Mergers and Acquisitions on CEO Compensation
Kumar, Praveen - 2012
Using a large sample of U.S. acquiring and non-acquiring firms and covering a broad sample of transactions, we examine the effects of mergers and acquisitions (M&A) on CEO compensation during 1993-2006, a period of intense M&A activity. We alleviate endogeneity concerns through dynamic panel...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013101686
Cover Image
Mergers and Managers : Manager-Specific Wage Premiums and Rent Extraction in M&As
He, Alex Xi - 2020
This paper shows that some managers systematically pay higher wages to rank-and-file workers and these managers are targets of M&As. We use a manager-firm-worker matched dataset covering the entire population of Denmark from 1995 to 2011, and develop a novel framework to identify manager fixed...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012846952
Cover Image
When Do CEOs Delegate Authority? Evidence from Mergers and Acquisitions
Greene, Daniel - 2018
We test theoretical predictions on when CEOs delegate authority to senior managers in mergers and acquisitions. Using a novel proxy for delegation, we find that CEOs are more likely to delegate when the firm is larger or more complex and are less likely to delegate when they have an...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012935934