We study the effect of board governance in state-owned and private banks by undertaking a study of commercial banks in India that has both bank groups. Covering a ten-year period from 2003 to 2012 that witnessed a large number of governance reforms in India, the results of our empirical analysis...

This article addressed one of the hardest unanswered legal questions facing the modern nonprofit corporation: How much discretion should nonprofit boards have to redefine an organization's mission - for instance by changing an acute care hospital into outpatient neighborhood clinics, or by...

This paper analyses the causes of managerial change and the impact of different reforms on firm performance, using survey data from 300 Ukrainian firms. The main findings are: 1) ownership and competition are linked to managerial change: de novo firms but also privatised firms experienced less...

Corporate scandals, reflected in excessive management compensation and fraudulent accounts, cause considerable damage. Agency theory's insistence on linking the compensation of managers and directors as closely as possible to firm performance is a major reason for these scandals. They cannot be...

We use a survey-based approach to provide new insight on managerial attitudes toward to market valuations — whether a corporate officer perceives her/his firm's stock price is undervalued or overvalued by the market. Though there is weak evidence in support of inside information hypothesis,...

This paper explores the impact of target CEOs' retirement preferences on takeovers. Using retirement age as proxy for CEOs' private merger costs, we find strong evidence that target CEOs' preferences affect merger activity. The likelihood of receiving a successful takeover bid is sharply higher...

Executive management as a distinct occupational category from general management seems to be becoming increasingly professionalized. From a power perspective, CEOs dominate the decision-making apparatus of our major business enterprises. From an attribute approach to professionalization, there...

We model the evolution of CEO quality in family firms. Agents learn about their own qualities over time by observing the successful outcome of their own actions, while failures drive agents out of the market. We show that joining the family business, while reducing the probability of failure,...