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Strategic delegation in experimental markets
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2000
contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009583883
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Strategic Delegation in Experimental Markets
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2021
contracts which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013321092
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Strategic Delegation In Experimental Markets
Huck, Steffen; Müller, Wieland; Normann, Hans-Theo - 2005
contracts, which determine their managers' salaries. One contract simply gives managers incentives to maximize firm profits …, while the second contract gives an additional sales bonus. Although theory predicts the second contract to be chosen, it is …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014069988
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Relative Performance Evaluation, Sabotage and Collusion
Bloomfield, Matthew J. - 2020
Relative performance evaluation (“RPE”) is a useful tool for shielding risk averse agents from systematic uncertainty. However, RPE can also destroy firm value by encouraging executives to implement excessively aggressive product market strategies to improve their relative standing through...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012843268
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Social comparison and optimal contracts in competition for managerial talent
Ulrichshofer, Anna; Walzl, Markus - 2020
We analyze the impact of social comparison on optimal contract design under imperfect labor market competition for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012253115
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Delegation Games : A Game Theoretical Perspective for Managerial Incentives
Akbulut Merchant, Cigdem; Jansen, Thijs; van Lier, Arie - 2017
Sklivas (1987). We assume that owners in a duopoly each hire a manager with a publicly observable contract which is not …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014034936
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The executive contract
Teague, Burton W. - 1978
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10000333007
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Bargaining over managerial contracts in delegation games : managerial power, contract disclosure and cartel behavior
Witteloostuijn, Arjen van; Jansen, Thijs; Lier, Arie van - In: Managerial and decision economics : MDE ; the … 28 (2007) 8, pp. 897-904
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10003611781
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Managerial optimism and debt contract design
Adam, Tim R.; Burg, Valentin; Scheinert, Tobias; … - In: Three essays on the syndicated loan market, (pp. 49-97). 2015
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011373645
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Relative performance evaluation, pay-for-luck, and double-dipping in CEO compensation
Jiménez-Angueira, Carlos E.; Stuart, Nathan V. - In: Review of quantitative finance and accounting 44 (2015) 4, pp. 701-732
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011333147