This study examines the relationship between cross-listing and managerial compensation of Chinese firms that concurrently issued A- and B-shares or A- and H-shares during 2001 - 2010. The results show that executive compensation is a positive factor to motivate Chinese A-share firms to...

This study investigates how CEO power is associated with stock price crash risk. We further examine the moderating roles of female directors’ critical mass and ownership structure on the relationship between CEO power and stock price crash risk. Employing one of the largest datasets to-date of...

The paper investigates costs and benefits of hiring a star CEO. Using a sample of Chinese listed firms between 2000 and 2010, we find that the appointment of a star CEO is associated with significantly positive cumulative abnormal returns surrounding the announcement day. These findings remain...

This paper investigates the effect of split-share structure reform on the dynamics between executive compensation and firm performance for Chinese public firms. Using panel data analysis and a dynamic GMM model, it reveals that the split-share structure reform has positive impacts on management...

On theoretical grounds, monitoring of top executives by the (supervisory) board is expected to be value relevant. The empirical evidence is ambiguous and we analyze three non-competing explanations for this ambiguity: (i) The positive effect on firm value of board monitoring is hidden in stock...

This study seeks to disentangle the human capital and the social capital of directors to improve our understanding of the value that directors bring to their boardroom. Employing social network analysis (SNA) to measure the social capital of directors and using a unique and comprehensive sample...

This paper uses a unique US dataset to analyze the demand for Directors' and Officers' liability insurance. This insurance protects managers mostly from shareholder litigation. Corporate insurance presents a much different environment than individual insurance and calls for in-depth empirical...

We examine CEO compensation, CEO retention policies, and M&A decisions in firms where founders serve as a director with a non-founder CEO (founder-director firms). We find that founder-director firms offer a different mix of incentives to their CEOs than other firms. Pay for performance...

We analyze the relation between CEO compensation and networks of executive and non-executive directors for all listed UK companies over the period 1996-2007. We examine whether networks are built for reasons of information gathering or for the accumulation of managerial influence. Both indirect...