This paper investigates the effects of managerial mergers and acquisitions related investment strategies on the exit risk of firms. Using a sample of hyperactive bidders, I show that managerial excessive acquisitiveness can precipitate firm exit. Overbidding is associated with weak corporate...

This chapter assesses the behavior of corporate managers and boards of directors within the framework of agency theory, stewardship theory, and psychological biases. In agency theory, a chief executive officer (CEO) is motivated to act in his or her own best interests rather than those of...

We explore the trade-off between managerial risk-taking incentives and firm-level credit risk. Assuming that risk-taking incentives do not increase firm value, risk-taking incentives can lead to an asset substitution problem that hurts creditors. However, it is possible that risk-taking...

This paper examines the relation between CEO inside debt holdings (pension benefits and deferred compensation) and corporate tax avoidance. Because inside debt holdings are generally unsecured and unfunded liabilities of the firm, CEOs are exposed to risk similar to that faced by outside...

Purpose – The purpose of this paper is to examine the association between earnings management and the gender of the firm's executives.Design/methodology/approach – Panel regressions of discretionary accruals on a set of female executive dummies and firm-specific controls.Findings – The...

Our study investigates, using both theoretical and archival empirical methods, the role of CEO career concerns as a determinant of earnings management behavior. The significance of earnings management in market economies is well documented. Our investigations are motivated by the disconnect...

The purpose of this study is to investigate the difference in the CSR perceived by the actors in the Indonesia economy represented by managers working in state-owned companies (BUMN) and non state-owned companies. The unit of analysis in this study is Indonesian managers. The population of this...

I examine the reputation and regulatory effects on the directors' turnover and their directorships when firms are accused of fraudulent financial reporting (FR). The results show that the directors at FR firms incur reputation costs from abnormal turnover in relation to the directors at non-FR...

The Dodd-Frank Act requires firms to include a clawback or holdback clause in executive compensation contracts. Using an experiment, we examine how executives react to the enforcement of these clauses after a restatement. We find that executives generally reduced the riskiness of their financial...

This study examines the effects of gender on executive financial decision-making as it relates to management earnings forecast error. The primary question addressed is: do female and male executives behave differently when issuing management earnings forecasts? Additionally, the following...