How and to what extent do managerial control benefits shape the efficiency of the takeover market? We revisit this … dark side, managers' private benefits of control distort firms' takeover incentives and hinder the reallocation role of the … takeover market. On the bright side, fear of a takeover induces underperforming managers to exert more effort and enhances the …

equity owned firms. Among public companies, purpose is lower for firms with high hedge fund ownership and higher for firms …

reforms in India, the results of our empirical analysis provide evidence of strong ownership effects with board independence …

empire-building CEOs. The prospect of a future takeover means that CEOs with no ownership stake will over-invest in some …'s position in a hostile takeover induce raiders to launch friendly takeovers sooner. The increased takeover threat induces CEOs … takeover gains are high. Optimal ownership-generated incentives and the market for corporate control add more value after …

We find a significant hump-shaped relation between firm valuation and CEO ownership when external governance (EG) is … firm-fixed effects. The results imply that CEO ownership and EG are substitutes in mitigating agency problems at low levels … of ownership. At large ownership, the combination of large voting rights and high wealth-performance sensitivity causes …

replacement when mutual funds are team managed and when fund boards more independent. Overall, our results indicate that …

We study how well-incentivized boards monitor CEOs and whether such monitoring improves performance. Using unique …, detailed data on boards' information sets and decisions for a large sample of private-equity-backed firms, we find that … gathering information helps boards learn about CEO ability. ‘Soft' information plays a much larger role than hard data, such as …