We study moral judgments regarding budgetary slack made by participants at the end of a participative budgeting experiment in which an expectation for a truthful budget was present. We find that participants who set budgets under a slack-inducing pay scheme, and therefore built relatively high...

We experimentally study the deception detection capabilities of experienced auditors, using CEO narratives from earnings conference calls as case materials. We randomly assign narratives of fraud and non-fraud companies to auditors as well as the presence versus absence of an instruction...

We experimentally study the deception detection capabilities of experienced auditors, using CEO narratives from earnings conference calls as case materials. We randomly assign narratives of fraud and non-fraud companies to auditors as well as the presence versus absence of an instruction...

We examine how CEOs can facilitate the development of investor trust that helps mitigate the effects of negative information. Results from an experiment show that investors trust the CEO more and are more willing to invest in the firm when the CEO communicates firm news followed by a negative...

We examine how CEOs can facilitate the development of investor trust that helps mitigate the effects of negative information. Results from an experiment show that investors trust the CEO more and are more willing to invest in the firm when the CEO communicates firm news followed by a negative...