We simultaneously analyze two mechanisms of the managerial labor market (CEO turnover and remuneration schemes) in two different regulatory regimes, namely before and after the sweeping governance reforms adopted in the UK in the 1990s. We employ sample selection models to examine firms in a...

This study examines the agency costs of corporate lobbying by exploring the relation between lobbying and excess CEO compensation. We show that CEOs of firms engaged in lobbying earn significantly greater compensation levels compared to CEOs in non-lobbying firms, after controlling for standard...

Extensive research finds that shareholder and CEO preferences affect demand for director services. We find a large body of evidence that independent director reputation incentives influence the supply of director services. These reputation incentives vary across firms and over time,...

This study examines the effect of outside director tenure length on firms’ market valuation and the voting behavior of outside directors. We make use of the new rule adopted by the Korean government in 2020 that prohibits outside directors from serving more than six (nine) years in a given...

We study, for the first time, whether and how directors' and officers' (D&O) insurance affects independent directors' voting. We provide new evidence that D&O insurance through the insurance channel and the insurance-monitoring channel incentivizes independent directors to monitor. The positive...

Using more than 30 million quarterly observations on investment funds, firms, and directors, we show that equity-ownership relationships between funds and directors comove when new firms appoint these directors. Funds follow directors from high operating performance and high valuation firms to...

We identify a sample of firms with directors employed by institutional investors and examine the effect of a direct channel of institutional monitoring. Using difference-in-differences tests, we find weak evidence that institutional directors have a positive effect on informational efficiency....

Using hand-collected data on CEO appointments during shareholder activism campaigns, this study examines whether shareholder involvement in CEO recruiting affects frictions in CEO hiring decisions. The results indicate that appointments of CEOs who are recruited with shareholder activist...