The aim of this paper is to explain relationship between earning management, corporate governance and managerial optimism through the governance characteristics that are board of directors such as independence, duality and size and ownership structure such as managerial participation, block...

Using a hand-collected sample of Italian family and non-family-controlled firms, we investigate the moderating effect of family ownership on the relation between earnings management and CEO turnover. Consistent with agency theory, we find a positive and significant relation between earnings...

We examine how compensation of chief executive officer (CEO) and corporate governance practices affect earnings management behavior in an emerging economy, Pakistan. Using 1836 firm-year observations from 260 firms listed in KSE for period 2005 to 2012, we do not find that CEO compensation has...

This study examines the effect of the exogenous increase in the presence of female directors on FTSE350 corporate boards in the UK, as mandated by the Davies Report (2011), on the association between earnings management and CEO incentive compensation. We use a hand-collected dataset of FTSE350...

This paper analyzes executive compensation in a setting where managers may take a costly action to manipulate corporate performance, and whether managers do so is stochastic. We show that an increase in the possibility of manipulation actually calls for executive pay to be more responsive to...

The paper investigates the optimal structure of executive compensation with the possibility of financial data manipulation. We characterize the optimal compensation contract analytically, and establish necessary and sufficient conditions for earnings management to occur. The model shows that the...

We examine how clawback provisions and board monitoring affect managers' use of discretion to achieve earnings targets. Using an experiment, we find that when board monitoring is weak, imposing clawback provisions has little impact on the total amount of earnings management activity. This null...

This paper analyzes executive compensation in a setting where managers may take a costly action to manipulate corporate performance, and whether managers do so is stochastic. We examine how the opportunity to manipulate affects the optimal pay contract, and establish necessary and sufficient...

The likelihood and speed of forced CEO turnover - but not voluntary turnover - are positively related to a firm's earnings management. These patterns persist in tests that consider the effects of earnings restatements, regulatory enforcement actions, and the possible endogeneity of CEO turnover...

Performance-based pay is an important instrument to align the interests of managers with the interests of shareholders. However, recent evidence suggests that high-powered incentives also provide managers with incentives to manipulate the firm's reported earnings. The previous literature has...