This paper formalizes the link among electoral uncertainty, fiscal policy and economic growth. The setup is a dynamic general equilibrium model of optimal growth and fiscal policy, in which fiscal policy is endogenized through a game between two political parties that can alternate in power.

This paper reviews recent theories that address cooperation and coordination issues in the conduct of fiscal policy in an economic union. This is done by discussing these issues in a complete, logically consistent framework that connects the various problems concerning fiscal policy in an...

The answer to this question is "yes". We examine noncooperative and cooperative equilibria under perfect capital mobility. To this end, we develop a two-country optimal growth model with endogenous national fiscal policies. The channel for interdependence is distortionary income taxes.

This paper presents a two-party dynamic model of optimal fiscal policy which integrates stabilizing electroral and partisan motives.

This paper examines whether incumbent national governments of the member states of the European Union have manipulated the fiscal policy instruments at their disposal in order to create national political business cycles, opportunistic or partisan, in the 1970-98 period.

Measured against PPP, the drachma effective exchange rate was overvalued by a significant amount, implying that the devaluation on March 1998 was an adjustment of the exchange rate towards the long-run price differentials. The paper also analyses the links between fiscal policy, interest rates...

The answer to this question is "yes". We examine noncooperative and cooperative equilibria under perfect capital mobility. To this end, we develop a two-country optimal growth model with endogenous national fiscal policies. The channel for interdependence is distortionary income taxes.

This paper formalizes the link among electoral uncertainty, fiscal policy and economic growth. The setup is a dynamic general equilibrium model of optimal growth and fiscal policy, in which fiscal policy is endogenized through a game between two political parties that can alternate in power.

This paper presents a two-party dynamic model of optimal fiscal policy which integrates stabilizing electroral and partisan motives.

This paper reviews recent theories that address cooperation and coordination issues in the conduct of fiscal policy in an economic union. This is done by discussing these issues in a complete, logically consistent framework that connects the various problems concerning fiscal policy in an...